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STATES-WAIVER OF STATE IMMUNITY TO SUIT WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO SuITs IN FEDERAL CouRTs-Although deriving its
force ·and e:ffect from the medieval period, the doctrine of sovereign
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immunity retains much of its original influence. Historically, the doctrine is based upon the rule that no suit may be brought against the King
without his consent.1 This concept found its way into international law,
and from this source was derived the freedom from suit that our individual states enjoy in their own courts. 2 With the development of the federal
union, new problems arose and many were resolved by the adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment, which forbids suit against a state in a
federal court by citizens of another state.8 The motivation for this
amendment was a belief that the sovereign state must be free from
judicial compulsion in the administration of its policies within the limits
of the Constitution.4 For many years the states retained their immunity
from suit with bulldog tenacity. 5 Recent trends, however, have indi1

See PoLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 181-83, 515, 518
(1911); 3 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462, 464-65 (1923). It is
stated in I BLACKST. CoMM., Jone's ed., 241-43 (1915), that: " .•• the law ascribes
to the king the attribute of sovereignty.... Hence it is, that no suit or action can be
brought against the king, even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction
over him. For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power.••."
2
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 54 S.Ct. 745 (1934); Sullivan v: Sao
Paulo, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 355. The federal judicial power does not
extend to cases or controversies between a state and its own citizens. Pennsylvania v.
Quicksilver Mining Co., 77 U.S. 553 (1870). This is so although the suit arises under
the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, IO S.Ct.
504 (1890).
8
The Eleventh Amendment, qualifying Article III, section 2, of the Constitution
of the United States provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any
foreign state." For a history of the Eleventh Amendment see I WARREN, THE SuPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 90-104 (1922). Generally, see Pilling, "An
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment," 15 M1cH. L. REv. 468 (1917); Hyneman, "Judicial Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment," 2 IND. L. J. 371 (1927).
See annotations on state consent to suit in 42 A.L.R. 1464 (1926); 50 A.L.R. 1408
(1927); 88 L. Ed. 1132 (1944).
4
Popular outrage with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dal. (2 U.S.) 419 (1793), upholding the right of a citizen
of South Carolina to sue the state of Georgia, probably brought forth the Eleventh
Amendment. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, IO S.Ct. 504 (1890), and Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 54 S.Ct. 745 (1934), the Supreme Court refused jurisdiction although neither case came within the express prohibition of the Eleventh
Amendment.
5
Professor Borchard, the foremost critic of state immunity from suit, points out
that: "Monarchical doctrines of Kings who can do no wrong and sovereigns above the
law were developed and inflated in the United States to a point never reached in
England. • • ." Borchard, "State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reforms," 20 A.B.A.J. 747 (1934). Consent statutes, no matter how sweeping,
have often been construed not to create liability for torts. Smith v. New York, 227
N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920); Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 P. 450
(1912); Davis v. State,_30 Idaho 137, 163 P. 373 (1917).
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cated a growing tendency to relax this sovereign immunity.6 With public
justice as their objective, statutes have extended the state's suability in
tort. 7 Further relaxation of the immunity principle has resulted from
judicial interpretation, some cases holding that a constitutional provision that private property shall not be taken without just compensation is a consent to suit. 8 Other courts have interpreted legislative
adoption of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act as a consent to
suit. 9 But despite these innovations, a spirit of strict construction has
prevailed where statutes granting consent to suit are concerned. Three
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court are illustrative.
The present position of the Supreme Court was made clear in the
case of Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read:
"When a state authorizes a suit against itself to do justice to
taxpayers who deem themselves injured by any exaction, it is not
6

Reasons for this tendency include " . . . the demands of modern life, the unprecedented expansion in governmental activities, the desire of legislatures to escape
the burden of political claims, the insistence of occasional judges and many writers ...."
Borchard, "State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reforms," 20
A.B.A.J. 747 (1934).
7 A careful survey and analysis of ~uch statutes will be found in Nutting, "Legislative Practice Regarding Tort Claims Against the State," 4 Mo. L. REv. I (1939).
Also see Shumate, "Tort Claims Against State Governments," 9 L. AND CoNTEM. PROB.
242 (1942). Progress has b'een made despite a distinction between immunity from
suit and immunity from liability.- Pennington Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 527, 46 S.W.
(2d) 1079 (1932), and Graham v. State, 109 S.C. 301, 96 S.E. 138 (1918), refuse
to accept the distinction. But see Stewart v. State Highway Comm., 166 Miss. 43,
148 S. 218 (1933); Smith v. State, 227. N.Y. 405, 125 N.E. 841 (1920); Manion
v. State Highway Commr., 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W. (2d) 527 (1942). Although the
state consents to suit, ordinary defenses, such as contributory negligence, should remain
available. Commonwealth v. Madison, 269 Ky. 571, 108 S.W. (2d) 519 (1937).
8 Bacich v. Board of Control of Calif., 23 Cal. (2d) 343, 144 P. (2d) 818
(1943); State Park Comm. v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W. (2d) 38 (1935). But
see Hawks v. Walsh, 177 Okla. 564, 61 P. (2d) 1109 (1936). There may be recovery in quasi-contract for benefits received through tort where there is consent to suit
on "contracts." See Nelson County v. Coleman, 126 Va. 275, IOI S.E. 413 (1919).
Such a consent does not authorize a suit against the state for damage for breach of
contract. Mississippi Centennial Exposition Co. v. Luderbach, 123 Miss. 828, 86 S.
517 (1920).
9
Harrington v. Cobb, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 185 S.W. (2d) 133. The contrary
has greater support. Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A. (2d) 880 (1944); Arnold
v. State, 48 N.M. 596, 154 P. (2d) 257 (1944). A state is subject to claims arising out
of the conduct of its business enterprises beyond its borders. City of Cincinnati v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Reeves, 292 Ky. 597, 167 S.W. (2d) 709 (1942). But see
Popper and Co. v. Pa. Liquor Board, (D.D. Pa. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 762. Endowment
of a state agency with the power to sue and be sued has been held consent to suit.
Utah Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission of Wyo. (D.C. Wyo. 1926)
16 F. (2d) 322. See also Heman Construction Co. v. Capper, 105 Kan 291, 182
P. 386 (1919).

1 947]

COMMENTS

35 1

consonant with our dual system for the federal courts to be astute
to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts." 10
In the above mentioned case, the Great Northern Insurance Co., an
Illinois corporation, instituted an action in a federal court against the
Insurance Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma to recover taxes paid
under protest. Petitioner alleged that the; tax discriminated against
foreign insurance coµipanies and was therefore unconstitutional. The
statute providing for recovery of the protested payments stated: "all
such suits shall be brought in the court having jurisdiction thereof." 11
The court insisted on a strict construction of the statute, and held, three
justices dissenting, that the state had not consented to suit in a federal
court. 12 The primary contentions of the three dissenters were: I) no
consent was required since the suit was only a common law action
against the collector to recover illegal taxes; 2) strict construction of
such statutes is contrary to general notions concerning moral responsibility of the state; 3) there is no indication of an intent to restrict
consent to suits in state courts; 4) petitioner could have sought an
injunction in the federal courts against payment of the tax and should
be able to seek recovery of the payment in such courts.18
The court next granted certiorari in a case concerning both the problem of interpretation of statutes granting consent to be sued, and the
problem of waiver of the sovereign immunity by the acts of state
authorities. In Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Department of the Treasury,u a foreign corporation brought suit in a federal court against the
treasury department and the individuals constituting it for the recovery
of taxes paid under protest. The action was brought under a state statute authorizing suit for the recovery of such taxes, and providing that
"the circuit or superior court of the county in which the taxpayer resides
or is located shall have original jurisdiction ...." 15 The state attorney
general defended on the merits in two federal courts,16 raising the
10

322 U.S. 47 at 54, 64 S.Ct. 873 (1944). Furthermore, when the federal
government consents to suit, the court will not imply consent to suit in a state court.
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 at 384, 389, 59 S.Ct. 292 (1939).
11
Okla. Stat. (1931) No. 12665.
12 The circuit court of appeals decided the case on its merits, upholding the
state tax. (C.C.A. 10th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 44.
13 The availability of such a remedy is extremely doubtful. Great Lakes Dredge
& Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070 (1943). See note 62, infra.
14
323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347 (1945). The case is abstracted in 44 M1cH.
L. REv. 166 (1945), and noted in 21 IND. L. J. 55 (1945).
15 lnd. Stat. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) § 64-2614 (a).
16 The two lower courts denied recovery of the tax paid under protest. See Ford
Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 24. Certiorari
was granted on petitioner's assertion that the decision of the circuit court of appeals
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defense of immunity from suit in the Supreme Court for the first time.
A unanimous court held that the legislature did not consent to suit in a
federal court and refused to imply authority in state officers 'to waive the
state's immunity from suit in individual cases.
Another instance of strict construction is the recent decision in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Utah Tax Commission. 11 Again there was an
_action by a foreign corporatidn in a federal court to recover taxes paid
under protest. Petitioner contended that inclusion· of subsidy_ payments
in the tax base constituted a violation of the Emergency Price Control
Act.18 But again the complaint was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Although the statute prov~ded for an action to recover the protested
payments in "any court of competent jurisdiction," 19 the court held
that the statutory provision fell short of a clear declaration by the
state of its consent to suit in a federal court. A vigorous dissent considered this a backward step from the progressive contraction of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and objected to the requirement of an
explicit consent to suit in a federal court.
These three cases and others which shall be incidental to this discussion indicate the necessity' for ·a separate treatment of the problems
of state consent depending on how the consent was given. Thus we find
that problems of consent arise in three distinct situations: I) where there
is a constitutional provision granting or denying consent to suit; 2) where
there are legislative provisions authorizing suit ~gainst the state; 3)
where there has been a possible legislative delegation of authority to
a state con:i.mission or officer to consent to suit.
Before discussing these important phases of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it should be recognized that in most cases there is an
initial problem of whether the suit is actually against the state.20 A
useful test, adopted in a few state decisions, is that stated in the Ford
case:
conflicted with the decision in Dep~. of Treasury v. International Harvester Co., 221
Ind. 416, 47 N.E. (2d) 150 (1943).
17
(U.S. 1946) 66 S.Ct. 745.
.
18
50 U.S.C. (1940) §§ ·901, 902 (e); 50 U.S.C.A. (1942) Appx. §§ 901,
902 (e).
19
Utah Code Ann. (1943) § 80-5-76, provides: " ••. ~ny taxpayer may pay his
occupation tax under protest and thereafter bring an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction for the return thereof ••••"
20
In each of the three recent cases, individual state officers were named as defendants. Early it was held that a suit not against the state in name was not within the
Eleventh Amendment. Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824).
This view has been abandoned in favor of the rule that consent is required where the
state is the real party against which relief is sought, and where a judgment fpr the
plaintiff would operate to control state action or subject the .state to liability. Worcester County Trust.Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 58 S.Ct. 185 (1937).
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" · . when the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in
interest, and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit
even though individual officials are nominal defendants." 21
Some courts have utilized this initial step to circumvent the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Thus, they hold that an action against a state
official to force the performance of an act not involving the exercise
of discretion does not require the consent of the state.22 Other cases
allow an injunctive action without the state's consent where the officers
or administrative agencies of the state are seeking to enforce an unconstitutional statute, or a valid law in an unconstitutional manner. 28 A
difficulty with the last mentioned decisions is that a judicial inquiry
is necessary to discover whether the statute is constitutional or the
actions of .the officials valid, and in many instances this determination
will settle the controversy.
I

Constitutional provisions pertaining to the subject of consent to suit
have caused some difficulty. The three Supreme Court cases that we
21
3z3 U.S. 459 at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347 (1945). This test, by the weight of
authority, cannot be considered all inclusive. It was applied uncritically, however, in
A.F. of L. v. Mann, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 188 S.W. (zd) z76. See Bachman v. Iowa
State Highway Commission, (Iowa 1945) zo N.W. (zd) 18.
22
Jersey City v. Zink, 133 N.J.L. 437, 44 A. (zd) 8z5 (1945), cert. denied, 66
S.Ct. 493 (1946). Shade v. Ferguson, (Ohio App. 1945) 6z N.E. (zd) 64z. These
cases constitute a qualification of the general statement that whether or not sovereign immunity is involved is dependent upon " •.• whether such suit seeks affirmative action
by such officer or whether its purpose is obtaining a preventive injunction." 1 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 161 (1938). Dictum supporting mandamus to compel an
act involving no discretion may be found in Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 9z
U.S. 531 at 541 (1875); also see Rolston v. Missouri Commissioners, 1zo U.S. 390
at 411, 7 S.Ct. 599 (1887). A suit against state officers to recover specific property
is not within the immunity doctrine. Tindal v. Wesley, 16i U.S. zo4 at zz1, 17
S.Ct. 770 (1897).
28
Injunction is granted on the theory that the officer is about to commit a personal tort. Ex parte Young, zo9 U.S. 1z3, z8 S.Ct. 441 (1908); Davis v. Cook,
(D.C. Ga. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 1004. An interlocutory injunction may be made available. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 59 S.Ct. 7z5 (1939). Courts are reluctant to
enjoin an official of high rank only indirectly connected with the enforcement procedure. Fitts v. Mc Ghee, 17z U.S. 516 at 5z9, 530, 19 S.Ct. z69 (1899). Consent
is required where the officers seek to enforce a valid law. Fuller v. Van Wagoner,
(D.C. Mic;:h. 194z) 49 F. Supp. z81; First. National Benefit Society v. Garrison,
(D.C. Cal. 1945) 58 F. Supp. 97z. The rationale of those cases allowing an action
against the officer is that in acting illegally he abandons the protection of the Eleventh
Amendment and violates the Fourteenth Amendment. For an analysis of these two
constitutional amendments see Pilling, "An Interpretation of the Eleventh Amend.
ment," 15 M1cH. L. REv. 468 (1917).
·
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have considered illustrate a policy to enforce the provisions of the
Eleventh Amendment to the fullest degree, at least where state
financial policies are concerned.24 Although most state constitutions
contain no provision concerning immunity from suit,25 many of them
provide that specific legislative consent is required. 26 In a few states,
however, an unusual constitutional provision governs the whole problem. For instance, in Florida consent may be granted only by a general
law; a special statute for this purpose is void. 27 Louisiana requires that
any statute authorizing suit against the state provide the precise method
of procedure and the effect to be given the judgment. 28 If this is not
done, the statute is invalid. A most striking provision is found in Alabama, where the constitution specifically prohibits any suit against the
state.29 The Alabama court has, however, skillfully circumvented this
provision in order to make available the device of tax payments under
protest. In that state it has been held that a statute providing that such
protested payment be held in a suspense account until the rights of the
taxpayer and the state are judicially determined is constitutional.30
24 The reasoning of these decisions would seem applicable to any case intimately
connected with the administration of state affairs.
25 Included in this group are the constitutions of Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
26 Ariz. Const. (1910) art. IV, § 18; Col. Const. (1879) art. XX, § 6, Ky.
Const. (1891) § 231; Neb-. Const. (1920) art. V, § 22; N.D. Const. (1889) § 22;
Ohio Const. (1912) art. I,§ 16; Pa. Const. (1873) art. I,§ II; S.C. Const. (1895)
art. XVII, § 2; S.D. Const. (1918) art. III, § 27; Tenn. Const. (1870) art. I, § 17;
Wash. Const. (1889) art. II, § 26; Wis. Const. (1848) art. IV, § 27; Wyo. Const.
(1889) art. 1, § 8. Generally, these provisions are dependent upon legislative enactments for effect.
27 Fla. Const. ( 18 8 5) art. III, § 22. See Southern Drainage District v.. State,
93 Fla. 672, II2 S. 561 (1927). Other constitutions containing similar provisions
are: Indiana Const. (1851) art. IV, § 24; ·Nev. Const. (1864) art. III, § 22; Ore.
Const. ( l 857) art. IV, § 24.
28 La. Const. (1921) art. III, § 35. See Martin v. State, 205 La. 1052, 18
S. (2d) 613 (1944).
29 Ala. Const. (1901) art. I, § 14. See Curry v. Woodstock Slag.Corp., 242 Ala.
379,. 6 S. ( 2d) 4 79 ( l 942). Also prohibiting suits against the state: Ark. Const.
(1874) art. V, § 20; Ill. Const. (1870) art. IV, § 26; W.Va. Const. (1872) art.
VI, § 35. Illinois has provided a court of claims [Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones, 1936)
§ 126062] as has New York [Court of Claims Act, N.Y. Laws (1929) 467 § 12-a].
See Waterman, "One Hundred Years of a State's Immunity from Suit," 14 Tmc. L.
REV. 135 at 158 (1936).
80 Glass v. Prudential Insurance Co., 246 Ala. 579, 22 S. 13 (1945). Borchard,
"Government Liability in Tort," 34 YALE L. J. I at I 2 ( 1924), states: "Constitutional provisions in four states prohibit any suits against the State though this does
not prevent the legislature from appointing a Board of Claims to pass upon claims,
with recommendations to the legislature."
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Generally, it would seem that the constitutions of most states properly omit any reference to the problem of sovereign immunity, in view
of the fact that such immunity is not dependent upon constitutional
provision or legislative enactment.81
2

Where the legislature has consented to suit against the state, the
question then arises whether the statute includes consent to suit in a
federal court. Almost every decision on this question has included a
consideration of the general policy of the state toward suits against
it in federal courts. Yet, such decisions have, in effect, created a
presumption that there is no consent to suit in a federal court, a clear
expression of contrary intent being required to negative such a presumption. That such a presumption concides with the public interest
is not self-evident. If the problem of statutory construction is very
difficult, should not the court assume jurisdiction and thus place a
premium upon skill in legislative drafting rather than penalize private
litigants who prosecute an action on the merits, only to find when
they reach the supreme tribunal that they must begin anew? 82 A statutory amendment or administrative ruling would prevent such an occurrence in the future if assumption of jurisdiction by a federal court
was contrary to the legislative intent.88
An investigation of a few statutory provisions may be helpful. One
early decision appears to be predicated upon a theory of liberal construction. The statute authorized suit "in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County," and the Supreme Court held that a suit in a
federal court was within the scope of the statutory provision.84 A subMiller v. Layton, 133 N.J.L. 323, 44 A. (2d) 177 (1945).
The case may again return to the United States Supreme Court. The three
recent decisions have accepted the statement in Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590 at
592, 24 S.Ct. 766 (1904), that: " . . . a taxpayer denied rights secured to him by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and specially set up by him, could
bring the case here by writ of error from the highest courts of the State."
83
The precise effect that the court will give state administrative interpretations
is not certain. But the court, adopting the view of the Read case, stated in Ford v.
Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 at 470, 63 S.Ct. 347 (1945): "Administrative
construction by a state of its statutes of consent has influence in determining our conclusions." In Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U.S. 273, 26 S.Ct. 252 (1906),
reliance was placed on contemporaneous administrative interpretation of state statutes.
84
See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 at 392, 14 S.Ct.
1047 (1894). This construction was deprived of considerable force when the court
concluded that the suit was not, in fact, against the state. See Interstate Construction
Co. v. Univ. of Idaho, (D.C. Idaho 1912) 199 F. 509, where the statute provided
that the action be brought in a state district court. The court upheld suit in a federal
court.
81

82
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sequent decision, Smith v. Reeves,3 5 wields greater influence today,
however. In that case the statute provided that the action be tried in
the "Superior Court of the county of Sacramento." 36 Not only did the
court refuse to find consent to suit in a federal court, but the justices
considered that reference to a particular state court warrants the inference that the legislature restricted its consent to suit in state courts.
This view no doubt facilitated the making of the decision in the Ford ,
case.37
In another decision the statute was ambiguous but contain~d restrictive provisions in regard to procedure and the trucing of costs.38 The
court construed the statute as restricting consent to suits in state courts.39
Such provisions were· given prominence in the Read case, for there the
statute required that the court give precedence to actions for the recovery of the protested payments, and provided for the kind of judgment
to be returned. 40 Although Justice Frankfurter insisted-that this was
" ... merely an admonition to courts of the importance of disposing
-of litigation affecting' revenue with all convenient dispatch," 41 the court
was, of the opinion that the judgment provided for by the statute "is
quite different in language, if not in effect, from the judgment a federal
court would have rendered." 42 It would seem that such a difference in
language is entitled to very little weight.
35
178 U.S. 436, 20 S. Ct. 919 (1900). For later decisions supporting Smith v.
Reeves see: Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151,. 29 S. Ct. 458 (1909);
Dunnuck v. Kansas State Highway Comm., (D.C. Kan. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 882;
O'Connor v. Slaker, (C.C.A. 8th, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 147, appeal dismissed, 278 U.S.
188, 49 S. Ct•. 158 (1929); Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Guernsey, (D.C. Wash.
1913) 205 F. 94.
36
California Political Code (Deering, 1944) § 3669.
31
In the Ford case the statute provided: " ••• The circuit or superior court of the
county in which the taxpayer resides or is located shall have original jurisdiction ••.."
Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) § 64-2614(a),
38
Mich. Pub. Acts (1899) act 97, adding§ 144 to the'general tax law of 1893,
specified the following procedure: A copy of the complaint was to be served upon the
prosecuting attorney, who was to send a copy to the auditor general within five days.
This was to be in lieu of service of process. The auditor general could, at his discretion, cause the attorney general of the state to represent him, and in such suits, no
costs were to be taxed.
·
·
89
Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 24 S. Ct. 766 (1904).
40
Okla. Stat. (1931) § 12665.
41
Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 at 62, 64 S. Ct. 873
(1944). The dissenters were unable to find any difference in the course of litigation
in a federal court, distinguishing Burford v. ~un Oil Co., 3~19 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct.
1098 (1943), where federal jurisdiction was relinquished to a specialized system of
state administration.
42
Great Northern Insurance Co: v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 at 55, 64 S. Ct. 873
(1944).
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. Innumerable factors necessarily influence judicial construction of
these consent statutes. The United States Supreme Court has recently
emphasized the importance to be given state administrative interpretation of such statutes. And elements mentioned by the dissenting opinions may assume importance in future decisions. 43 Among other things,
the dissenters have pointed out that federal courts within a state have
been considered courts of that state for many purposes.44 In view of
these considerations, where the course of litigation in the federal court
would be the same as that in a state court, and where there is diversity
of citizenship or a federal question, it is difficult to justify a refusal of
jurisdiction in a case as close as the Kennecott case.45
When consent statutes are considered in the state courts, questions
of a different nature generally arise. Some decisions restrict the type
of suit rather than the court in which the action may be prosecuted.
Thus it has been held that a· consent to suit in contract actions does not
contemplate actions in tort. 46 Other decisions restrict c6nsent statutes
by holding that an action can be maintained only if there is an available
appropriation to pay the claim for which recovery is sought.47 The
result of considerable state litigation was concisely stated by a federal
court: 48
43
The dissenting opinion in the Read case was most forceful. The justices argued
that in other statutory provisions of Oklahoma, consent is explicitly restricted to suits
in state courts. They pointed out that a consequence of the decision is to allow suits
in a federal court against counties and other governmental sub-divisions of the state,
refusing jurisdiction in a suit against the state raising the same kind of issue. And
relying on the ruling in Illinois Central Ry. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28, 21 S. Ct. 251
(1901), they stated that the defense of state immunity from suit must be raised by
appropriate pleading in the lower courts.
44
A federal court has been dee~ed a court of the state in which it was located for
the purpose of condemnation proceedings. See Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 at 255, 256, 25 S. Ct. 251 (1905). The majority
in the Read case recognized that federal courts are treated as courts of the state for
many purposes, justifying its exception because state fiscal problems were involved.
45 When compared with the language in the Read and Ford cases, the decision
in the Kennecott case appears to be rather indecisive. It may well be that a contrary
result would have been reached had the state attorney general defended on the merits.
46 Fouchaux v. Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans, (La. App. 1939)
186 S. 103. Suit may be maintained for money had and- received under a statute
authorizing suit against the state by persons having "claims on contract." Ford Motor
Co. v. State, 59 N.D. 792, 231 N.W. 883 (1930); and Michigan Central Ry. Co.
v. State, 85 Ind. App. 557, 155 N.E. 50 (1927), upheld recovery in quasi-contract for
the benefits received through commission of a tort.
47
Griffis v. State, (S.D. 1943) II N.W. (2d) 138.
48
Smith v. Rockcliffe, (C.C.A. 9th, 1898) 87 F. 964 at 967. Affirmed 178 U.S.
436, 20 S. Ct. 919 (1900).
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"The state has the unquestioned right to select the forum in .
which it shall be sued,49 to prescribe the manner in which the suit
shall be conducted, and to impose upon the prosecution of the
action any condition that may be deemed proper.50 It may even retract its permission to be sued after an action has been begun.61"
Thus there prevails a general tendency to limit the effect of statutes
granting coi;isent to sue the $tate. It may well be that if the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is to be preserved, a policy of strict construtcion
is the only proper course. Such a policy, however, need not be followed
so rigidly as to be without regard for consequences. Where the
federal courts construe state consent statutes in a restrictive manner,
they only seek to refrain from interference with state policies. In doing
this, they seldom strengthen this much criticized doctrine1 for their
decisions do not restrict the scope of the consent statute itself. But the
state decisions•have in many cases been responsible for unduly extending the doctrine of state immunity, under the guise of strict construction, in a manner which undermines governmental dignity and refuses
to give recognition to modern concepts of the moral responsibility of
the state. Many states might well ponder the statement of the Supreme
Court dissenters that it is not wise -to treat consent statutes "in the
spirit in which seventeenth century criminal pleading was construed." 52
49
State ex rel. Thiedicke v. Superior Court for Thurston County, 9 Wash. (2d)
309, 114 P. (2d) 1001 (1941). See Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Commonwealth, 306
Mass. 347, 28 N.E. (2d) 465 (1940). Suit is restricted to the court or county specified by the statute. Mullen & Rouke v. Dwight, 42 S.D. 171, 173 N.W. 645 (1919);
Brown v. Ford, 112 Miss. 678, 73 S. 722 (1917). Consent to be sued in circuit court
of the county where injury occurs is limited to courts of the consenting state. Paulus
v. State of South Dakota, 58 N.D. 643, 227 N.W. 52 (1929).
50
State v. Jv!iser, 50 Ariz. 244, 72 P. (2d) 408 (1937); State ex rel. Davis v.
Love, 99 Fla. 333, 126 S. 374 (1930). Where a statute requires written notice of
intention to file a claim, this notice is jurisdictional. Buckles v. State, 221 N.Y. 418,
117 N.E. 811 (1917).
51
Oliver American Trading Co., Inc. v. Gov. of the United States of Mexico,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1924) 5 F. (2d) 659. A state may withdraw the consent it has given
without impairing the obligation of a contract. Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. (61 U.S.)
527 (1857); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 8 S.Ct. 164 (1887). But judgment against
a state cannot be taken away pending writ of error, by repeal of the statute which
authorized the state to be sued. McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 19 S. Ct.
134 (1898). See Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, (C.C.A. 4th,
_1936) 81 F. (2d) 513, where the court held that repeal of a statute providing for
payment of the tax refunds under protest and suit for recovery must be construed as
operating prospectively, since retroactive construction would constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of the rights of taxpayers theretofore instituting actions to recover
such protested payments.
52
Justice Frankfurter, in the dissent in Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47 at 60, 64 S. Ct. 873 (1944).
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The problem whether there has been a legislative delegation of
authority to a state commission or officer to consent to suit is intimately
connected with the problem of statutory construction. Indeed, when
this issue confronts the courts it may be necessary to interpret the provisions of two distinct statutes: I) the statute granting consent to suit;
and 2) the statute governing the general duties and powers of various
officers and commissions. This was the precise situation in the Ford
case. The statute specifically authorized the attorney general to represent the state in actions brought under provisions of the statute on
which petitioner's suit was based. 58 But since that statute was construed
as excluding suits in federal courts, it would have been somewhat inconsistent to hold that the same statute delegated authority to a state
officer to waive the sovereign immunity by his general appearance and
defense on the merits in a federal court. Petitioner, however, had
vigorously contended that a general statute empowering the attorney
general to appear and defend actions brought against the state or its
officers conferred on such officer power to consent to suit against the
state. 54 The court refused to follow this reasoning since Indiana decisions had held that the attorney general exercised only those powers
specifically delegated to him. 55 The decision does implicitly recognize
that specific legislation could confer on such an officer the discretionary
lnd. Stat. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) § 64-2614 (c) provides: "It shall be
the duty of the attorney-general to represent the department, and/or the state of Indiana,
in all legal matters or litigation, either criminal or civil, relating to the enforc'ement,
construction, application and administration of this act, upon the order and under the
direction of the department."
54
Section 49-1902, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), provides generally: "Such
attorney-general shall prosecute and defend all suits that may be instituted by or against
the state of Indiana, the prosecution and defense of which is not otherwise provided
for by law, ••• and he shall be 'required to attend to the interests of the state in all
suits, actions or claims in which the state is or may become interested in the Supreme
Court of the state."
55
Julian v. State, 122 Ind. 68, 23 N.E. 690 (1890); State ex. rel. Bingham v.
Home Brewing Co., 182 Ind. 75 at 87-95, 105 N.E. 909 (1914). In State ex rel.
Woodward v. Smith, 85 Ind. App. 56, 152 N.E. 836 (1926), the state of Indiana
waived its immunity by filing a cross-complaint for affirmative relief. See also Stoner
v. Rice, 121 Ind. 51, 22 N.E. 968 (1889), where the state auditor appeared and
pleaded to the complaint in an action originally between two private citizens. The
court held that the auditor could not avoid the judgment on the ground of state immunity. See also McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa 489, 149 N.W. 593 (1914), where
appearance and answer on the merits was held to constitute a waiver of state immunity
by the attorney general. Appearance by the state attorney general under a statute delegating to him general powers and duties was held a waiver of immunity in People ex
rel. Atty. Gen. v. Detroit, G.H. & M.R. Co., 157 Mich. 144, 121 N.W. 814 (1909).
58
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power to grant consent in individual cases. The constitutionality of
such a delegation of legislative power was not questioned.5 6
Considerable conflict in judicial decisions constituted the background for the Ford decision. In several cases the Supreme Court had
held that the appearance of a territorial officer in a court of the United
States was a voluntary submission to jurisdiction.57 And with emphasis
upon administrative interpretation and the failure of the state to assert
any rights du~ng an interval of twenty years, the court in another
decision held that the voluntary appearance of the state attorney general in a prior action constituted a waiver of the sovereign immunity. 58
Subsequent decisions, however, clearly have held that a state officer
cannot waive the state's immunity from suit unless there i~ an express
statutory authorization. 59
.
The reasoning of the Ford case is not entirely convincing. It is
clear that a private citizen or an attorney who appears generally and
answers on the merits waives the court's lack of jurisdiction over his
person. 60 Moreover,_ the court will probably assume jurisdiction al56
Although such a delegation of discretionary power would be more restrictive
than a general consent to suit, if accompanied by standards created by the legislature,
there should be no violation of a constitutional provision prohibiting -:onsent by special
act. It would appear that such a delegation of' power would not be valid under a constitution prohibiting any suit against the state. See People v. Sanitary District, 210 III.
171, 71 N.E. 334 (1904).
.
51
Puerto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627 at 632, 34 S. Ct. 461 (1913). In this
case Puerto Rico had voluntarily petitioned to be made a party, but later claimed immunity. Refusing this plea, the court stated: " .•• the immunity of sovereignty from
suit without consent cannot be carried so far as to permit it to reverse the action invoked
by it and to come in and go out of court at its will, the other party having no right of
resistance to either step." The same result was reached in Richardson v. Fajardo Sugar
Co., 241 U.S. 44, 36 S.Ct. 476 (1916). See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 2 S.
Ct. 878 (1883).
58
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 26 S. Ct. 252 (r906).
The ·court held the judgment in Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 244
(1872), to be res judicata and binding on the state. On the basis of a statute authorizing the attorney general to "stand in judgment for the state," the court assumed that
such officer possessed authority to consent to suit. The statute was not in itself suf.ficient, contemporaneous administrative interpretation, lacking in the Ford case, probably constituting the decisive factor.
59
O'Connor v. Slaker, (C.C.A. 8th, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 147, appeal dismissed,
278 U.S. 188, 49 S. Ct. 158 (1929); Dunnuck v. Kansas State Highway Commission,
(D.C. Kan. 1937), 21 .F. Supp. 882; The Guaranty and Surety Co. v. Guernsey,
(D.C. Wash. 1913) 205 F. 94; Adams v. Bradley, 5 Sawyer 217, 1 Fed. Cas., No. 48
(1878). In Farish v. State Banking Board, 235 U.S. 498 at 512, 35 S. Ct. 185
( l 9 l 5), the court found the unauthorized defense of a suit by the state banking board
to be ineffectual as a waiver of state immunity.
·
60
Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 253 (1855); Morgan v. Hoey, 209
Mich. 655, 177 N.W. 200 (1920); Wilson Bros. v. Haege, 347 lll. 140, 179 N.E.
459 (1932); JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT,§ 19 (1942).
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though the attorney· was not specifically authorized by his client to
make such an appearance. 61 Should not officials representing a sovereign power be subject to the same restrictions? Is there reason for the
bestowal of this additional protection upon the states? The only clear
answer would seem to involve a differentiation between the methods
by which consent to jurisdiction is granted. A person can consent by
appearance, but where the state is concerned, consent is the exclusive
province of the legislature. This distinction is another manifestation of
strict construction in the ~eld of sovereign immunity. There is considerable logic in the distinction, despite the additional protection given
the state, for it would seem inconsistent to construe the statutes so very
strictly and yet be lax in implying a power in administrative officials to
consent to suit.
The restrictive attitude which the Supreme Court has assumed is
not free from difficulties and defects. In its determination to refrain
from interference with fiscal problems of the states, the court may be
impairing the policy behind statutes providing for payment of taxes
under protest. Where diversity of citizenship or a federal question
exists, a taxpayer may choose to make an outright payment and then
immediately prosecute a personal liability suit against the individual
tax collector. It seems clear that such an action can be maintained in
a federal court without the state's consent, if accompanied by allegations that the tax is unconstitutional.02 Two factors of practical importance, however, support the Court's determination to remain an
61
McNeil v. Gossard, 68 Kan. II3, 74 P. 628 (1903). Some cases go so far as
to hold that the appearance by an attorney binds the party whether the attorney was
employed by the party or not. Ab~ott v. Dutton, 44 Vt. 546 (1872). The presumption that an attorney is authorized is not conclusive, and a proceeding by 1 totally
unauthorized attorney will be suspended or vacated upon a timely application of the
party for whoni the attorney Wlumed to act. See 2 MEECHEM, THE LAW oF AGENCY,
§ 2156 (1914); JUDGMENTS RESTATEMENT,§ 12 (1942).
62
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 58 S. Ct. 185 (1937);
Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547, 38 S. Ct. 205 (1918), Justice Frankfurter, in his
dissent in the Read case, argued that the taxpayer could bring suit in a federal court
to enjoin the tax collector from seeking to enforce an unconstitutional tax. But in
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U,S. 293 at 298, 63 S. Ct. 1070
(1943), the court denied relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and
stated: "Interference with state internal economy and administration is inseparable
from assaults in the federal courts on the validity of state taxation, and necessarily
attends injunctions, interlocutory or final, restraining collection of state taxes. These
are the considerations of moment which have persuaded federal courts of equity to
deny relief to the taxpayer-especially when the state, acting within its constitutional
authority, has set up its own adequate procedure for securing to the taxpayer the recovery of an illegally exacted tax." See Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 52 S. Ct.
217 (1932); Lockwood, Maw and Rosenberry, "The Use of the Federal Injunction,"
43 HARV. L. REV. 426 (1930).
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advocate of strict construction in all cases involving state immunity:
I) judicial pressure for explicitness in legislative provisions is commendable; 2) generally there will be no hardship in forcing the taxpayer to seek recovery in a state court.
It should be recognized that these recent decisions definitely place
the burden of going forward on the state legislatures. In the interests
of both state and taxpayer, the law-making bodies certainly will seek
to make provisions for the payment of taxes under protest more efficient
and more beneficial. To achieve these ends, the legislature may not
desire to waive the sovereign immunity from suit in state and federal
courts, thus subjecting the state to the burden of defending a flood
of un~ifted claims. It is suggested that an efficient_ compromise might
assume the form of legislation delegating to the state attorney general,
or similar officer, the power to consent to suit where certain specified
requirements are fulfilled, vesting in such officer a limited discretion.
Other states, especially those in the industrial areas and with large
populations, may find more desirable the creation of a commission or
court of claims, with appropriate provisions for judicial review. 68
. Richard C. Scatterday, S.Ed.
63 For statutory references, see Nutting, "Legislative Practice Regarding Tort
Claims against the State," 4 Mo. L. REv. I (1939); Waterman, "One Hundred Years
of a State's Immunity from Suit," 14 TEX. L. REv. 135 (1936); 41 CoL. L. REv.
1236 (1941).

